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A Review and Analysis of Service Level Agreements and
Chargebacks in the Retail Industry
Chun-Miin (Jimmy) Chen
Freeman College of Management, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania 17837
jimmy.chen@bucknell.edu
April 5, 2018

ABSTRACT
Purpose – This study examines service level agreements (SLAs) in the retail industry
and uses empirical data to draw conclusions on relationships between SLA parameters and
retailer financial performance.
Design/methodology/approach – Based on prior SLA theories, hypotheses about the
impacts of SLA confidentiality, choice of chargeback mechanisms, and chargeback penalty
on retailer inventory turnover are tested.
Findings – Retailer inventory turnover could vary by the level of SLA confidentiality, and
the variation of retailer inventory turnovers could be explained by chargeback penalty.
Research limitations/implications – The research findings may not be readily applicable to SLAs outside of the retail industry. Also, most conclusions were drawn from publicly
available SLAs.
Practical implications – The significant relationships between SLA parameters and retailer inventory turnover imply that a retailer could improve its financial performance by
leveraging its SLA design.
1
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Originality/value – Not only does this study contribute to the understanding of retail
SLA design in practice, but it also extends prior theories by investigating the implications
of SLA design on retailer inventory turnover.
Keywords Supplier relations; Supply chain management; Retailing; Order fulfillment
Paper type Research paper

1 INTRODUCTION
“Vendor compliance is imperative to our collective success” (Macy’s, 2017). Retail supply
chains are increasingly reliant on vendors’ demand-fulfillment compliance (Craig et al.,
2015). Many retailers improve the effectiveness and efficiency of inbound logistics by maintaining a vendor compliance guide that clarifies the expectations of order fulfillment (Terry,
2013). For example, Tiffany & Co. implemented a vendor compliance program to provide
a single-source reference for packaging, routing, and documentation procedures for a large
number of small craft shops that have little logistics expertise (Bradley, 2001). In practice,
the key aspect of a vendor compliance guide is often the service level agreement (SLA), a
host of requirements with key performance indicators for demand-fulfillment expectations
(Douglas, 2006; Friedman and Yazdi, 2010; Douglas, 2012; Inbound Logistics, 2014). The
expectations often include, but are not limited to, on-time delivery and fill rate measured
over some finite time horizon (Whipple and Russell, 2007). In recent decades, more and
more retailers have designed requirements based on their needs and charge noncompliant
vendors a penalty. The professional journals in the areas of supply chain management
and logistics are never short on topics about retailers’ use of SLA parameters or chargebacks (Katz, 2003; Manrodt and Vitasek, 2008; Gilmore, 2010; Douglas, 2012; Terry, 2013;
Inbound Logistics, 2014; Attain Consulting Group, 2015). Retailers have no restrictions
when designing SLA parameters, and from the vendors’ perspective, chargebacks are out
of control. The purpose of this study is to analyze, in the presence of chargebacks, how a
retailer’s design of SLA parameters might in return affect its own financial performance.
2
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In general, SLAs stipulate a retailer’s minimum standards for acceptable shipment
arrival dates and shipment completeness. Additionally, retailers often specify contingent
penalties in SLAs as motivation for vendors to follow any mutually agreed-upon standards
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). As such, retailers believe that SLAs can improve
the efficiency of the inbound logistics and material handling processes (CVS, 2016). For
example, if shipments arrive after the required date or if the fill rate is less than the required
target, then the retailer could deduct from the vendor payment according to the penalty
specified in the SLA – a vendor chargeback, which is essentially revenue for retailers.
Noncompliant vendors often fight chargebacks in order to recover revenues deducted by
retailers (RetailingToday, 2014). Attain Consulting Group (2015) surveyed more than
500 companies and found that on-time or on-target requirements in an SLA are common
triggers of vendor chargebacks. On-time requirements typically refer to a due date by which
the shipment must arrive, whereas on-target requirements typically refer to a percentage
of the purchased quantity filled over a finite review horizon. The retail industry relies on
SLAs and vendor chargebacks to ensure uniformity in receiving inbound shipments from
vendors. For example, Dollar Tree (2015) stated that failures to comply with the SLA, such
as the inability to ship on time, could result in charges to the vendor. Boscov’s Department
Store (2015) kept an expense-offset list of routing guide violations; failure to comply with
the shipping requirements would result in the violation fees indicated.
The objective of this empirical study is twofold. First, this study aims to offer an
overview of SLA parameters in the retail industry. A vendor compliance document is often classified as confidential because the document may include the retailer’s proprietary
information. Thus, the actual design of SLA parameters and chargebacks in the retail
industry has not been common knowledge among researchers. An initial review of some
sampled SLAs indicates that SLAs tend to differ with respect to requirements and chargebacks. Considering that consultants and organizations offer tutorials to vendors on how to
navigate increasingly complicated SLA requirements, uniformity of SLA parameters does
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not seem to be the case in practice (Katz, 2016; Retail Value Chain Federation, 2017;
Boyle, 2017). The second objective is to investigate the implications of SLA parameters on
retailer financial performance. Prior studies theorized that well-designed SLA parameters
can effectively coordinate a supply chain. In this study, we explore another facet of SLAs
by investigating (1) the implication of SLA confidentiality and parameters on retailer financial performance and (2) how much SLA parameters and chargebacks can help explain
the variation of retailer financial performance.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we contextualize the empirical background of vendor compliance. In Section 3, specific SLA parameters considered in this
study are explained. In Section 4, we introduce relevant theories and develop hypotheses
to be tested. In Section 5, we describe the methodology for data collection and processing.
In Section 6, we conduct the data analysis and report the results. In Section 7, analysis
results are discussed to offer insights into improving SLA design. In Section 8, implications
of the study results are presented to offer some guidance on improving SLA design, along
with the conclusion of this study.

2 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT
Dating back to the 1970s, the first vendor chargeback appeared in the apparel business
(Hays, 2001). Since then, the practice of vendor chargebacks has become increasingly common in many other industries, while vendors were usually at a weaker position to dispute
any questionable chargebacks (Hays, 2001; Roubos et al., 2012). This seemingly unfair
chargeback practice between retailers and vendors was mostly the case until 2005, when
famous apparel retailer Saks Fifth Avenue was involved in high-profile federal investigations
initiated by its clothing vendors (Rozhon, 2005a; Byron, 2005). In 2005, many of Saks’s
vendors were outraged by the constant lack of transparency in Saks’s chargeback practices
(Rozhon, 2005b). Specifically, Saks was accused of improperly collecting approximately
$20 million in chargebacks from its vendors for reasons such as short shipments, late deliv4
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eries, mismarked merchandise, and improper packaging (Rozhon, 2005c; O’Connell, 2007).
Facing an onslaught of vendor complaints and federal investigations, the department store
conducted an internal investigation and announced that it would return at least $21.5
million to its vendors. Despite the reimbursements, Saks was still taken to court due to
the lack of appropriate records justifying the chargebacks made. Two years later, Saks
settled the lawsuits and returned an undisclosed amount of money to some of the vendors
(Barbaro, 2007; O’Connell, 2007). Similar stories with Dillard’s and Federated Department Stores (now Macy’s) were also reported (Rozhon, 2005d). In the wake of the highly
publicized investigations into Saks’s practices, the retailer-vendor atmosphere gradually
changed in vendors’ favor. Notably, retailers have since begun to provide more governing
transparency by supplying comprehensive vendor compliance instructions or SLAs that
describe demand-fulfillment expectations and chargeback policies.
But the transparency afforded by SLA documentation does not stop retailers from designing SLAs in self-serving ways. In general, demand-fulfillment requirements are tailored
to retailers’ needs (Friedman and Yazdi, 2010). In addition to common expectations such
as on-time delivery and fill-rate target, retailers can use many other means of measuring
how a purchase order is fulfilled (Novack and Thomas, 2004; Manrodt and Vitasek, 2008).
Although SLA chargebacks have a laudable purpose of improving supply chain and operations efficiency, vendors tend not to talk openly with retailers about chargebacks if they
are still doing business with the retailers (Hays, 2001). This reticence could have allowed
retailers to increase requirements and chargebacks without restraints. Hence, it is not surprising that concern began to build among vendors that the practice of vendor chargebacks
was being abused (Gilmore, 2010). Discussions about vendor compliance and chargeback
policies have continued in recent years (Daugherty et al., 2010; Friedman and Yazdi, 2010;
Douglas, 2012; Terry, 2013; Inbound Logistics, 2014; Boyle, 2017). On the contrary, reports about actual applications of chargebacks are not as common. Understandably, SLA
chargebacks take place only if something goes wrong, and neither the retailer nor the ven-
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dor would be proud of such incidents. Nonetheless, Altaner (1998) revealed that clothing
vendors constantly got hit with chargeback penalties paid to their retail store chains when
instructions were not followed. For more anecdotes about SLA chargebacks, please see
Table 4 in the Appendix.
SLAs may not be a binding contract between vendor and retailer without complementary enforcing mechanisms that serve to deter vendors’ opportunistic behavior against
the SLA requirements (Skjoett-Larsen, 1999; Schneeweiss and Zimmer, 2004; Ogden and
Carter, 2008; Raue and Wieland, 2015). The literature indicates that enforcements fall into
two categories: implicit consequences (e.g., business relationship) and explicit chargebacks
(e.g., financial penalties) (Charron, 2006; Chain Store Age, 2016). An implicit consequence typically entails decreased promotional priority, less prominent or reduced shelf
space, reduced business opportunities, revoked vendor status, or future financial penalties
(Wilkinson, 1996; Chain Store Age, 2003; Ryan, 2010). For example, The Bon-Ton Stores
(2015) stated that vendors would not be back-charged for failing to meet a fill-rate target,
but unacceptable fill rates could jeopardize the business relationship and/or generate future
chargebacks. Advance Auto Parts (2015) stated that repeated failures to meet order-fill
and lead times could result in loss of supplier status. Publix Super Markets (2005) stated
that noncompliance jeopardizes the business relationship and could result in a reduction
and/or termination of business activity. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that retailers favor explicit chargebacks over implicit consequences for better control of a vendor’s
logistics performance. For example, Walmart has enforced vendor compliance with respect
to its supply chain reliability program by adopting explicit chargebacks (Cassidy, 2010;
Boyle, 2017). Thus, this study focuses on SLAs with explicit chargebacks.

3 SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENT PARAMETERS
A stream of empirical studies on the use of SLAs can be related to our study. Groves and
Valsamakis (1998) compared performance measures under the influence of various types
6
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of vendor-customer relationships. Forslund (2007) suggested that formulations, updates,
and measures of logistics performance can be joint efforts between vendor and customer.
Forslund (2009) showed that the design of SLA parameters or chargebacks can vary by
the industry or by the firm. Forslund (2012) indicated that logistics performance measures
could be similar among logistics service providers, but the service level target can be
different. On the one hand, these studies demonstrated the academic interest in SLA
parameters. On the other hand, a review of retail SLAs in practice and links between SLA
parameters and retailer financial performance remain to be addressed in the literature.

3.1 Service Level Requirements
In this study, on-time requirements pertain to meeting a specified delivery due date. Teng
and Jaramillo (2005) illustrated on-time delivery as a common expectation of vendors on
which their performance is evaluated. Wang and Yan (2009) incorporated a penalty cost
charged to the supplier for each customer order not fulfilled on time. van de Klundert
and Wormer (2010) minimized the number of customers (i.e., implicitly assuming a lumpsum penalty for each noncompliance delivery) whose waiting time exceeded the threshold
values specified in the SLAs. In practice, acceptable deliveries have to be made by some
prespecified due date that appears on the purchase order or by a number of days after the
due date, which is the so-called grace period (Lee et al., 2001; Jaruphongsa et al., 2004).
An initial observation of sampled SLAs suggests that retailers tend to omit information
about grace periods in their SLAs. Thus, this study will focus on on-time requirements
and the consequences of late delivery.
We also considered on-target requirements, or fill-rate targets, which specify the completeness or accuracy of the expected shipment quantity across the delivery (or deliveries)
as specified on the purchase order. On-target noncompliance events have been recognized
as one of the common non-correctable fulfillment errors in the retail industry (Craig et al.,
2015). The fill rate of a finite review horizon has been extensively studied in the litera-
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ture. Chen et al. (2003) and Banerjee and Paul (2005) investigated the distributions of
the expected fill rate as a function of the review horizon. Thomas (2005) demonstrated
the impacts of the relationship between the length of the review horizon and the fill rate
on inventory decisions. Durango-Cohen and Yano (2006) studied how the supply chain
could be coordinated under the vendor chargeback that is a function of the fill rate. Other
applications of fill rate in the context of inventory management can be found in Guijarro
et al. (2012).

3.2 Noncompliance Chargebacks
An explicit chargeback (hereafter “chargeback”) is some financial penalty either deducted
from the payments or separately charged to the vendor to discourage the vendor’s demandfulfillment errors (Craig et al., 2016). Albeit undesirable, chargebacks are supposedly the
most straightforward way to motivate vendors to adhere to SLA requirements (Frazelle,
1998; Putka, 2000). A survey of 100 top retail and consumer goods companies showed
that 67% of participants used chargebacks if the vendors failed to meet SLA requirements
(Business Wire, 2007). One common justification for imposing chargebacks is to offset the
retailer’s administrative costs or operating losses associated with processing noncompliant
deliveries (Buckle, 2015). Sieke et al. (2012) and Liang and Atkins (2013) both proved that
contracts with chargebacks can coordinate a supply chain. Ryall et al. (2009) empirically
found that high-technology firms’ contracts could be more detailed and more likely to
include chargebacks when engaging in frequent deals with trading partners.
Chargebacks are typically either variable-fee or flat-fee penalties. Specifically, the
variable-fee penalty varies with the quantity or percentage by which actual performance is
below target performance, whereas the flat-fee penalty does not change according to the
extent by which actual performance deviates from the target. SLA examples of variablefee penalties are as follows: Big Lots (2015) stated that for a purchase order that was
not shipped on time, the deduction amount would be $250 plus up to 6% of the invoice
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amount, depending on the number of delayed days. Pep Boys (2011) charges 5% of cost on
items not shipped if the fill rate falls below the target. Examples of flat-fee penalties are
as follows: A retail bookseller (for confidentiality reasons, the name is hidden but available
upon request) specifies that the fill-rate target is 100% and the penalty cost per order if
the delivery quantity is under the purchased quantity is $200. A drugstore chain (name
available upon request) stated that a purchase order would be considered noncompliant
and would result in a $150 penalty per purchase order if less than 96% of total quantities
ordered were not delivered by the due date.
To summarize, Figure 1 visualizes the structure of the SLA parameters under consideration in this study.

On-time requirement

Implicit
consequences e.g., business
relationship degradation
Explicit
chargeback

Weak
(publicly available)

Service
Level
Agreement
(SLA)

Variable-fee
Mechanism
Flat-fee

SLA parameters

On-target requirement

Variable-fee

Mechanism
Flat-fee

Figure 1: Simplified SLA characteristics and parameters
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4 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Known purposes of a retailer’s SLA is to standardize, streamline, and optimize the retailer’s
inbound logistics. Furthermore, it is generally believed that effective inbound logistics services enable retailers to improve their financial performance because they are able to offer
better product availability to their end consumers (Groves and Valsamakis, 1998; Christensen et al., 2007; Toyli et al., 2008). Thus, we plan to investigate the potential links
between SLA parameters and retailer financial performance. Throughout the analysis,
retailer inventory turnover, a common financial indicator in the retail industry, is considered a performance variable, whereas the SLA parameters and chargebacks are considered
explanatory variables.

4.1 SLA Confidentiality
In practice, a retailer is not obliged to publish its SLA. As a result, many retailers archive
their SLAs on dedicated web space where only preapproved vendors can log in and access
the SLA-related documents. In this case, the SLAs are not shared with entities outside
the retailers’ supply chains, including competing retailers. Some SLAs are available in
the public domain, whether or not those SLAs proclaim to be confidential. These SLAs
are shared not only within but also outside the retailers’ supply chains, including with
competing retailers. For the purpose of this study, we define SLAs that are unavailable
in the public domain as strictly confidential SLAs. Conversely, we define SLAs that are
available in the public domain as weakly confidential SLAs.
Regardless of the level of SLA confidentiality, a retailer’s SLA is to be vertically shared
with the trading partners within its supply chain. Vertically sharing SLA information
across a firm’s own supply chain can drive the firm toward collaborative business models and improve logistics or financial performances (Fawcett et al., 2007; Blankley, 2008;
Biotto et al., 2012). Mason-Jones and Towill (1997) and Mason-Jones and Towill (1999)
substantiated the tremendous benefits of information sharing and advocated the necessity
10
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of information sharing throughout the supply chain. In addition to the expansive empirical
studies, analytical studies such as Lee et al. (2000) and Cachon and Fisher (2000) theoretically quantified the benefits of information sharing in a supply chain as well. Blankley
(2008) studied how financial gains are realized as the result of investments in supply chain
management technology. Moreover, Blankley (2008) constructed a chronological model
that neatly laid out the causalities related to our study: a firm’s information sharing can
lead to operational improvements, which can improve the firm’s inventory investment and
logistics measures (e.g., fill rates and lead times), which consequently improves the firm’s
financial performance. As such, the positive effect that the vertical sharing of SLA information has on a retailer’s financial performance is not of concern in this study.
But little is known about the effects of sharing SLA information with competing retailers
on a retailer’s own financial performance. Li (2002) stated that sharing market demand or
own cost information with competing retailers has uncertain impacts on the entities engaged
in the information sharing. That is, in the presence of competition, obtaining additional
information does not necessarily make the informed retailer better off, and giving away
private information to other retailers does not necessarily make the original information
holder worse off. Zhang (2002) considered the confidentiality of the shared information and
analyzed retailer competitions under various game-theoretic settings. Moreover, one of the
conclusions made by the author is that no information sharing is the unique equilibrium
for both Cournot and Bertrand types of competition. Li and Zhang (2008) found that
increasing the level of information confidentiality can alleviate double marginalization and
hence benefit the supply chain as a whole. Many other articles on information sharing
under horizontal competition also conclude that firms may not want to share demand
information under competition (Anand and Goyal, 2009). Given the expansive studies of
sharing demand information in the presence of competing retailers, we hypothesize that
retailer financial performance could be affected by the level of SLA confidentiality in a
certain way.

11
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H1. Retailers with weakly confidential SLAs have lower inventory turnovers than retailers with strictly confidential SLAs.

4.2 Chargeback Mechanisms: Flat-fee versus Variable-fee
In the event of SLA noncompliance, the vendor facing a flat-fee penalty pays a fixed
amount, whereas the vendor facing a variable-fee penalty pays a fee that is a function
of the magnitude of the underperformance. While both chargeback mechanisms can be
found in the literature, many supply chain management studies use variable-fee penalties as
inventory underage or back-order costs when modeling supply chain coordination problems.
Qi et al. (2009), Teunter et al. (2010), and Beutel and Minner (2012) minimized total supply
chain costs consisting of inventory holding and penalty costs, and the latter can be modeled
such that they are proportional to the shortage quantities. Relatively fewer studies have
modeled a flat-fee penalty as part of the supply chain costs. Thomas (2005) used simulation
to investigate the implications SLA review horizon has on the optimal base-stock level
while assuming flat-fee penalties for the SLAs. Sieke et al. (2012) derived optimal SLA
parameters and their interdependencies when the supply chain is coordinated by either a
flat-fee or variable-fee penalty. Liang and Atkins (2013) compared the effectiveness of the
chargeback mechanisms in coordinating a supply chain. Liang and Atkins (2013) concluded
that a variable-fee penalty is more robust than a flat-fee penalty with respect to mitigating
the strategic behavior of a vendor in fulfilling demands, which could increase the variance
of the fill rates and hence negatively affect the retailer’s product availability. Thus, we
hypothesize that retailer inventory turnover would vary by SLA chargeback mechanism in
a certain way.
H2a. For on-time requirements, the retailers setting a flat-fee penalty have lower inventory turnovers than the retailers setting a variable-fee penalty.
H2b. For on-target requirements, the retailers setting a flat-fee penalty have lower
inventory turnovers than the retailers setting a variable-fee penalty.

12
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4.3 Financial Penalty
Prior studies on SLA chargebacks tend to, for a given set of parameter values, focus on
optimal penalties that can coordinate the supply chain. That is, the implication of the
chargeback penalty variation is not always of concern. Nonetheless, some studies suggest
that the magnitude of the penalty could positively affect the supplier’s compliance, which
then improves the retailer’s inventory management. Zimmer (2002) illustrated that penalty
costs not only compensate the shortage cost of the vendor but also influence the vendor’s
capacity decision. Ching et al. (2011) examined the service capacity problem in outsourcing
supply chains. Moreover, the buyer can impose a fixed penalty on the vendor if the vendor
fails to meet the promised delivery-time requirement. Ching et al. (2011) showed that
the penalty cost has a positive impact on the equilibrium service capacity. Chen and
Thomas (2016) illustrated that increasing the chargeback penalty tends to help the retailer
gain a preferential inventory allocation from the vendor. Therefore, we hypothesize that
a significant relationship exists between SLA chargeback penalties and retailer inventory
turnover. Note that we focus on only a certain penalty component that is invariant with
the shortage units (Chen, 2017):
Penalty = a + b(D − y)c ,
where D is the demand quantity; y is the supplier’s base-stock level; and a, b, and c
are constant terms that determine the mechanism of the chargeback. The penalty cost
involving b and c depends on the shortage unit. In this study, we disregard the variable
portion of the penalty (i.e., b and c) when analyzing the relationship between the chargeback
penalty and the retailer’s financial performance for simplicity.
H3. Chargeback financial penalty magnitude has significant effects on retailer inventory
turnovers.
Figure 2 visualizes the aforementioned hypotheses.

13

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

SLAs
Level of
Confidentiality
H1
Chargeback
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• Fill-rate Review Horizon
• Collaborative Inventory
Management

Figure 2: Hypothesized relationship between SLA confidentiality or SLA parameters and
retailer inventory turnover
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5 METHODOLOGY
We aim not only to help vendors better understand industry-wide expectations of logistics
measures but also to help retailers make informed decisions when designing or updating
their SLAs. To this end, we independently collected SLA documents of major U.S. retailers from the Internet. Subsequently, we consolidated SLA confidentiality, chargeback
mechanisms, fill-rate targets (the percentage of ordered quantity expected to be filled),
fill-rate review horizons (the time horizon during which the fill rate is being measured),
and retailer inventory turnover (the cost of goods sold divided by the average inventory
cost) for analysis purposes. To ensure the availability of a company’s inventory turnover
data, we looked at only the publicly listed retailers.

5.1 Sampled Population
More than 1 million U.S. companies in the retail sector could have SLAs with their suppliers
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). The sampled population was reduced to a manageable
size of 184 companies by selecting retailers with public financial information as well as
annual sales greater than $100 million. We then exhaustively searched for weakly confidential SLAs that were publicly available: 56 companies had their SLA document available
on the Internet, while 128 companies either granted access only to preapproved vendors (on
dedicated websites) or appeared to have no information regarding the document. Table 1
describes the SLA confidentiality frequency and the inventory turnover statistics by retail
subsectors. For the SLA confidentiality frequency in relation to other retailer attributes,
please see Table 5 in the Appendix.

5.2 Parsing Data
In each of the sampled SLAs, we searched for chargeback information related to on-time
or on-target requirements. Parsing every sentence was necessary to collect the needed
SLA parameter information, if available at all, in the document. For example, SLA docu15
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Table 1: Sampled SLA confidentiality and inventory turnover statistics by retail subsector
Retail subsector

SLA confidentiality

Inventory turnover

Weak

Strict

M

SD

Motor vehicle and parts dealers (441)

3

12

5.31

4.42

Furniture and home furnishings stores (442)

2

9

3.87

2.59

Electronics and appliance stores (443)

2

10

8.48

10.94

Building material, garden equipment,

3

7

3.83

2.19

Food and beverage stores (445)

5

12

14.69

7.60

Health and personal care stores (446)

2

7

10.59

13.94

Gasoline stations (447)

1

1

46.65

31.59

19

24

4.53

2.43

4

11

3.03

1.19

General merchandise stores (452)

11

12

4.36

2.31

Miscellaneous store retailers (453)

3

2

5.08

2.45

Nonstore retailers (454)

1

21

21.01

30.64

and supplies dealers (444)

Clothing and clothing accessories stores (448)
Sporting goods, hobby, book,
and music stores (451)

16

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

ments have different names such as “compliance manual,” “shipping requirement,” “routing
guide,” “vendor reference,” or “logistical standards.” Similarly, chargebacks can be referred
to as “deductions,” “fees,” “fines,” “failure costs,” “violation charges,” “expense offsets,”
“penalties,” “recovery charges,” or “reimbursement charges.” We also discovered that
the 100% fill-rate target can be denoted as “complete shipment,” “no partial shipment
is allowed,” “no short shipping,” “ship exact quantity as ordered,” and the like. When
none of the chargeback-related terms could be found in the documents, we viewed such
SLAs as contracts with implicit consequences. Table 2 tabulates the frequency of the SLA
confidentiality and parameters to be analyzed in Section 6.
Table 2: SLA confidentiality and parameters for statistical analysis
Confidentiality
(frequency)

Logistics
expectations
On-time
requirement

Weak (56)

On-target
requirement

Strict (128)

N/A

Enforcement
(frequency)
Explicit
chargeback (39)
Explicit
chargeback (31)
N/A

Mechanisms
(frequency)
Variable-fee penalty (17)
Flat-fee penalty (22)
Variable-fee penalty (14)
Flat-fee penalty (17)
N/A

5.3 Data Transformation
Studies show that differences in retailer inventory turnover could be attributed to retail
subsectors (Gaur et al., 2005; Gaur and Kesavan, 2009). Because the sampled population
consisted of publicly traded companies, we were able to collect the inventory turnover
information of each sampled retailer as well as the subsector averages. To control the
effects of retail subsectors on inventory turnover, we used centered inventory turnovers –
an individual retailer’s turnover minus the respective subsector turnover average. Moreover,
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to improve the normality conformance of the data, natural logarithms of centered inventory
turnover and chargeback penalties were used.

6 DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS
To offer conclusions for the hypotheses, we will use a 5% significance level for evaluating
the statistical results. We use various statistical methods such as two-sample t-tests and
generalized linear regression. All of the following statistical analyses were done in MATLAB
(2017).

6.1 Hypothesis 1
We conducted a two-sample t-test using the assumption that the two samples are from
normal distributions with unknown and unequal variances (Brown-Forsythe test p < 0.05).
The results show that the retailers with weakly confidential SLAs had lower inventory
turnovers (M = 0.18, SD = 2.77) than did those with strictly confidential SLAs (M = 3.08,
SD = 14.15), t(147.61) = −2.23, p = .014 (one-tailed). Note that the non-integer degrees
of freedom were from Satterthwaite’s approximation.

6.2 Hypotheses 2a and 2b
Alternative Hypotheses 2a and 2b were evaluated through a two-sample t-test. For the
on-time requirement hypothesis, we assumed that the two samples were from normal distributions with unknown and equal variances (Brown-Forsythe test p > 0.05). The results
show that retailer inventory turnover was not significantly different between SLAs with flatfee penalties (M = 0.40, SD = 1.89) and SLAs with variable-fee penalties (M = −0.52,
SD = 2.35), t(37) = −1.36, p = .09 (one-tailed). The pooled estimate of the population
mean is 0.0001 and the standard deviation is 2.10. Thus, Hypothesis 2a is not supported.
For the on-target requirement hypothesis, we assumed that the two samples were from
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normal distributions with unknown and unequal variances. The results show that retailer
inventory turnover was not significantly different between SLAs with flat-fee penalties
(M = 0.22, SD = 1.21) and SLAs with variable-fee penalties (M = −0.11, SD = 2.72),
t(17.23) = −0.43, p = .336 (one-tailed). Thus, Hypothesis 2b is not supported.

6.3 Hypothesis 3
The alternative hypothesis that the chargeback penalty can significantly affect the retailer
inventory turnovers was tested with a generalized linear regression model (Kutner et al.,
2005). Gaur et al. (2005) and Gaur and Kesavan (2009) established regression models to
investigate the relationship between a firm’s inventory turnover and financial performance,
such as capital investment, gross margin, and annual sales. We extended the regression
models by using the SLA parameters and chargebacks as the explanatory variables. In
our parsimonious regression model, we controlled the collaborative inventory-management
practices as well as the fill-rate target and review horizon in the SLAs when testing the
hypothesis (Sieke et al., 2012; Liang and Atkins, 2013; Abbasi et al., 2017).
When a vendor and a retailer form a vertically collaborative supply chain to share
their responsibilities and information to serve end customers, the supply chain is better positioned to carry out collaborative inventory management activities such as quick
response; collaborative, planning, forecasting, and replenishment; vendor-managed inventory; and continuous replenishment planning (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002; Williams
and Tokar, 2008). Considering the potential impacts of these activities on retailer inventory
turnover, we controlled the collaborative inventory-management activities for the regression model by devising a simple binary variable indicating whether the retailer engages in
any collaborative inventory management activities as shown in the SLA.
As for controlling the fill-rate target and the review horizon for the model, we found
that the sample fill-rate targets range from 80% to 100%, while more than half of the
observations are 100% (skewness = −2.88). Similarly, the sample review horizons can
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be per order, weekly, biweekly, monthly, quarterly, or some number of days, whereas more
than half of the observations are per order or weekly. To focus on the effects of the extreme
values of the variables rather than the mean changes in the turnover for one unit of change
in the variable, we converted the heavily skewed quantitative data, or categorical data, into
dichotomous variables (MacCallum et al., 2002). That is, we respectively partitioned each
of the observations of the fill-rate target and review horizon into two distinctive groups: (1)
less-than-100% fill-rate target (reference category) or 100% fill-rate target and (2) singleperiod review horizon (reference category) or multiple-period review horizon.
Table 3 shows that the on-time chargeback penalty appears to be an insignificant predictor of the retailer inventory turnover, but the on-target chargeback penalty can be a
significant predictor for retailer inventory turnover. Moreover, the impact of the on-target
chargeback penalty on retailer inventory turnover is negative. For example, holding the
other predictor variables constant, we expect that a 10% increase of the on-target chargeback penalty can result in an estimated 0.25% decrease in inventory turnover. Please see
the Appendix for the calculation details. The Anderson-Darling test shows the regression
residuals followed a normal distribution.

7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Significant Role of SLA Confidentiality (H1 Supported)
Consistent with the findings in Li and Zhang (2008), we found that SLA confidentiality
holds value to the information owners/retailers and tends to associate with high retailer
inventory turnover. The following studies help explain our findings. Raith (1996) stated
that if a firm is perfectly informed about its own cost, it is generally not true that it
benefits from obtaining information about its rivals as well. Vives (1984) stated that, if
the goods are substitutes, not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm
in Cournot competition. In an oligopoly where firms observe uncertain market signals,
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Table 3: Generalize linear regression model results
Coefficient
Intercept

SE

t-statistics

p-value

4.0662

0.0439

92.6040

<0.001

0.0091

0.0076

1.1940

0.2510

−0.0266

0.0090

−2.9606

0.0097

Review horizon

−0.0167

0.0152

−1.0999

0.2887

Fill-rate target

−0.0082

0.0126

−0.6541

0.5229

0.0104

0.0180

0.5799

0.5706

Explanatory variables
log on-time chargeback penalty
log on-target chargeback penalty
Controlled for explanatory variables

Collaborative inventory management

Number of observations: 21; error degrees of freedom: 15
Root mean squared error: 0.0233
R2 : 0.398; adjusted R2 : 0.198
F -statistic vs. constant model: 1.99; p-value = 0.139
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Gal (1985) found that not revealing private information is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Although SLA parameters are not exactly uncertain marketplace signals such as demand,
it is still up to the firms to determine the level of output to be publicized on the basis of
the information available to the firm.
A rather intuitive explanation of the results is as follows. If a retailer’s SLA is strictly
confidential, then no competing retailers would know about the retailer’s chargeback penalty
costs. More important, a retailer with a strictly confidential SLA may take advantage of
weakly confidential SLAs by strategically adjusting its chargeback penalty according to
the weakly confidential SLAs for improving its own vendor’s fulfillment service. For example, having suffered from ongoing compliance issues, the supermarket chain Safeway
(2013) stated that “an unintended consequence of not having a penalty for not showing up
for an appointment is that our loads are compromised so carriers can make appointments
with competitors that currently have a missed appointment fee.” As a result, Safeway
responded to publicly available SLA penalty information and instituted a fee-based compliance program. The supermarket chain would not have made such a decision had it not
known about its competitors’ SLA information.
Another plausible explanation of the results is as follows. The assumption for H1 is
that every retailer has either a weakly or a strictly confidential SLA. If relaxing this assumption, then a possible scenario is that retailers not publicly sharing their SLAs actually
have not furnished any SLAs. After all, an SLA is not (yet) a required legal document to
enable transactions between a retailer and a vendor. As such, retailers with little inbound
logistics troubles may not feel the urgency to have an SLA, whereas retailers facing major inbound logistics issues may feel a pressing need to correct or alleviate the issues by
furnishing an SLA. For example, the aftermarket auto chain Pep Boys had many vendors
who frequently missed delivery deadlines or delivered incomplete shipments. As a result,
Pep Boys was unable to move merchandise in and out of its distribution centers efficiently.
To systematically monitor vendor activities over time, Pep Boys started to use a compli-
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ance management system to manage fulfillment-related rules that govern inbound logistics
(Douglas, 2006).

7.2 Insignificant Role of Chargeback Mechanism (H2a and H2b Not Supported)
The results analysis suggests that retailer inventory turnover does not significantly vary by
the retailer’s choice of chargeback mechanism, namely variable-fee and flat-fee penalties.
Some prior studies help explain the results. Sieke et al. (2012) showed that both chargeback
mechanisms can effectively coordinate a supply chain as long as the chargeback penalties
are set in conjunction with other SLA parameters. Chen (2017) numerically compared
the flat-fee and variable-fee chargeback mechanisms and found that neither mechanisms
can minimize the expected noncompliance penalty costs for the supply chain under all
experimented values of SLA parameters.
On a side note, as shown in Table 2, the SLAs with a flat-fee penalty seem to be more
popular than the SLAs with a variable-fee penalty. Our conjecture is that the use of the
flat-fee penalty is conceptually more straightforward than the variable-fee penalty, thereby
reducing administrative burdens in justifying penalty increments with respect to the magnitude of underperformance. Another plausible explanation is that blatantly setting an
intimidating flat-fee penalty may help deter bad performance from vendors. Moreover,
Chen and Thomas (2016) found that a retailer could lose its strategic leverage in influencing a supplier’s choice of inventory allocation rule if the retailer uses a variable-fee penalty,
thereby making the variable-fee penalty less popular than the flat-fee penalty.

7.3 Significant Role of Chargeback Penalty (H3 Partially Supported)
The results show that the on-time chargeback penalty has little to do with retailer inventory
turnover, which makes us wonder how careful the retailers were when determining their
on-time chargeback penalties. Could the magnitude of the on-time chargeback penalty
be entirely arbitrary? Interestingly, one supermarket chain (name available upon request)
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has stated the following in its vendor compliance document: “The [delivery compliance]
fee structure was developed by taking our competitor’s policies, plotting them and taking
the mid-point. We feel the fee is fair and the intent isn’t to generate fees; it is to change
the behavior so we can receive the inventory on the same day the carrier committed to
delivering it.” It turns out that benchmarking other retailers’ chargebacks and adopting
the industry norm seems to be one way that a retailer may set its on-time chargeback
penalty. As a result, there could be little connection between retailers’ on-time chargeback
penalties and their financial performance (Craig et al., 2016).
On the other hand, we found that the on-target chargeback penalty can help explain the
variation of retailer inventory turnover, revealing the strategic role that the SLA chargeback
penalty plays in contributing to retailer financial performance. A domestic merchandise
retail chain (name available upon request) states the following in its vendor compliance
document: “[The company] has gone to great lengths to ensure that chargebacks are not
arbitrary and accurately reflect agreed upon deductions, and that all compliance-related
chargebacks meet our needs for cost recovery.” Moreover, the negative sign of the coefficient
could be explained as follows. In general, a chargeback should be significant enough to deter
bad fulfillment performance of vendors. However, Liang and Atkins (2013) pointed out that
a strategic vendor who faces an SLA chargeback might drop efforts in fulfilling the retailer’s
order if the vendor has no chance of attaining the target in the review horizon. Intuitively,
the larger the chargeback is, the more likely a vendor may quit servicing its retailer early,
thereby hurting the retailer’s financial performance eventually.

7.4 Research Limitations
Considering that the size of a sample contributes to the statistical power of the test, we
tried to collect as many SLAs as possible. In addition, the sampled SLAs were all from
the retail industry, which somewhat limits the generalizability of the findings outside of
the retail industry. Last, this empirical study aims to shed light on what SLA parameters
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and chargebacks are in practice and how they may affect retailer financial performance.
Despite the limitations, we hope this study provides guidance to future SLA researchers.

8 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
8.1 Theoretical Implications
Future research studies may consider investigating the effectiveness of using implicit chargebacks in SLAs. Despite the focus on explicit chargebacks, implicit consequences are considered as capable as explicit chargebacks when it comes to contributing to the success
of a vendor’s performance (Wiengarten et al., 2013). Slobodow et al. (2008) showed that
the application of implicit consequences in the context of trust and a long-term relationship can lead to improved fill rates and on-time deliveries. Liang and Atkins (2013) discussed how relational factors, such as reputation, may play a role in SLA enforcement. In
fact, contracts with an appropriate combination of explicit chargebacks and implicit consequences appeared to be a subject of interest in many studies (Baker et al., 1994; Poppo
and Zenger, 2002; Levin, 2003; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). Holmstrom (1981) provides a
qualitative comparison between contracts with explicit chargebacks and those with implicit
consequences. Economic literature also has extensive discussions on the essences of implicit
consequences. The enforcing mechanisms of a contract with implicit consequences, such as
business relationship degradation, have been recognized as effective incentives in contract
theory (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989, 1998; Levin, 2003). That is, the contract between two parties leverages “job security” as the most important non-financial motivation
and can be enforced on mutually-agreed upon terms (Azariadis, 1975). With subjective
performance measures, Levin (2003) stated that contracts with business relationship termination mechanisms could be optimal. To enable such contracts, repeated transactions
between two parties are necessary to credibly carry out the termination upon each other
(Levin, 2003). By having a contract with implicit consequences, the value of the business
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relationship, not the value of any contract component, becomes subjective. Bull (1987)
showed how contracts with implicit consequences, or “gentleman’s agreements,” can effectively bind contracting parties in place of a legal contract in the labor market. The implicit
consequences can be particularly effective if a vendor is in a weak negotiation position or
views its reputation as more important than any other logistical measurements (Zinszer,
1997; Forslund, 2007; Nyaga et al., 2013). However, the conditions under which a retailer
would choose implicit chargebacks over explicit chargebacks have not been analyzed in the
context of SLAs.
Future work may also investigate the implications of the chargeback mechanisms on
a supply chain’s expected penalty cost. In the sample, we have observed many different
mechanisms of explicit chargebacks:
• Convex mechanism: Penalty increases nonlinearly as fulfillment performance drops
further below a required level of service (it may or may not contain a flat-fee penalty
as the minimum penalty).
• Linear mechanism: Penalty increases linearly as fulfillment performance drops further
below a required level of service.
• Affine mechanism: Penalty comprises a flat-fee penalty and a linear penalty.
• Stepwise mechanism: Penalty increases intermittently as fulfillment performance
drops further below a required level of service (it may or may not contain a flatfee penalty as the minimum penalty).
Retailers can choose any of these chargeback mechanisms. Chen (2017) compared the
flat-fee and linear penalties and found that they resulted in markedly different expected
penalty costs, all else being equal.
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8.2 Practical Implications
First, simply because retailers with weakly confidential SLAs tend to have lower inventory
turnover does not imply that they must immediately increase the level of confidentiality of
their SLAs. The causality behind this finding requires further research. Second, retailers
should not set SLA chargebacks wildly different from the industry norm. Third, the choice
of chargeback mechanism may not matter as much as the magnitude of the chargeback
penalty. Last, symbolically charging a small penalty to foster a long-term relationship with
vendors could attribute more to good financial performance for a retailer than punitively
charging a large, off-putting penalty. Overall, the empirical evidence gained from this study
suggests that retailers who want to improve their inventory turnover should not overlook
the opportunity held by SLA design.

8.3 Conclusions
Retailers rely on their vendors to deliver products on time and fill orders up to the fill-rate
target to ensure operations efficiency and product availability. In the presence of SLAs,
vendors are expected to follow retailers’ inbound logistics requirements and face chargeback penalties for any noncompliance such as late or partial deliveries. This empirical
study offers insights that could be valuable for improving the understanding of SLA design
in the retail industry. Specifically, we confirmed that retailers that keep their SLAs strictly
confidential (not shared outside the retailers’ own supply chains) tend to have higher inventory turnovers than those that keep their SLAs weakly confidential (shared with any
entities outside the retailers’ own supply chains). Furthermore, we found that the choice of
chargeback mechanism (i.e., flat-fee versus variable-fee penalty) has little effect on retailer
inventory turnover. Last, we show that the larger the on-target chargeback penalty, the
smaller the retailer inventory turnover could be. Overall, this exploratory study adds to
the existing literature on SLAs in three ways: providing an overview of SLAs, summarizing common SLA parameters and chargebacks, and making statistical conclusions with
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respect to theoretical beliefs or conventional wisdom about SLA design. Most important,
this study reveals opportunities for retailers to improve inventory turnovers via SLA design.
We encourage future research to advance the understanding of SLA practices.
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APPENDIX
Additional Empirical Evidence
Table 4 shows the anecdotal references that illustrate the effectiveness of explicit chargebacks on improving a vendor’s demand-fulfillment performance.
Table 4: Empirical evidence from professional commentators
References
Explicit chargeback

Frazelle (1998); Avery (2000); Chain Store Age (2003); Atkinson (2007); Business Wire (2007); Harrington (2008); Slaughter
(2009); Cassidy (2010); Terry (2012); Douglas (2016)

28

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

Additional Statistics of the SLAs
Table 5 shows the frequency of weakly or strictly confidential SLAs by the retailers’ number
of employees or sales amount.
Table 5: Confidentiality of sampled SLAs by retail characteristics
Retailer characteristics

SLA confidentiality
Weak

Strict

1, 001 − 5, 000

5

58

5, 001 − 10, 000

10

26

10, 001 − 50, 000

24

27

50, 001 − 100, 000

8

6

100, 001 and more

9

11

12

52

$1, 000 − 2, 500

8

26

$2, 500 − 5, 000

9

21

$5, 000 − 10, 000

10

6

$10, 000 and more

17

23

Number of employees

Sales amount (million)
$100 − 1, 000

Regression Coefficient Numerical Example
Let CIT denote the centered inventory turnover, and P 1 and P 2 denote any two values
of the on-target chargeback penalty. Hold the other predictor variables at any fixed value,

29

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

and the regression model yields
log(CIT (P 2)) − log(CIT (P 1)) = −0.0266 · (log(P 2) − log(P 1))
⇒ log(CIT (P 2)/CIT (P 1)) = −0.0266 · log(P 2/P 1)
⇒ CIT (P 2)/CIT (P 1) = (P 2/P 1)−0.0266 .
Therefore, if P 2/P 1 = 1.1, then CIT (P 2)/CIT (P 1) = 0.9975.

References
Abbasi, B., Hosseinifard, Z., Alamri, O., Thomas, D., and Minas, J.P. (2017), “Finite time horizon fill rate analysis for multiple customer cases”, Omega, available at:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048317302608 (accessed 7 September
2017).
Advance

Auto

Parts

(2015),

“Shipping

requirements

guide”,

available

at:

https://corp.advanceautoparts.com/ (accessed 6 October 2016).
Altaner, D. (1998, ), “For clothing suppliers, the devil is in the details”, Sun Sentinel, 2 April, pp.
3D.
Anand, K. S. and Goyal, M. (2009), “Strategic information management under leakage in a supply
chain”, Management Science, Vol. 55 No. 3, pp. 438-452.
Atkinson,

W.

(2007),

“Get

in

charge

of

your

chargebacks”,

available

at:

http://multichannelmerchant.com/opsandfulfillment/get-in-charge-of-your-chargebacks01012007/ (accessed 6 October 2016).
Attain Consulting Group (2015), “Customer deductions: 2015 benchmark survey”, available at:
http://attainconsultinggroup.com (accessed 14 March 2016).
Avery, S. (2000), “Measuring performance takes on new importance”, Purchasing, Vol. 129 No. 3,
pp. 123-126.
Azariadis, C. (1975), “Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 83 No. 6, pp. 1183-1202.

30

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

Baker, G., Gibbons, R., and Murphy, K.J. (1994), “Subjective performance measures in optimal
incentive contracts”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109 No. 4, pp. 1125-1156.
Banerjee, A. and Paul, A. (2005), “Average fill rate and horizon length”, Operations Research
Letters, Vol. 33 No. 5, pp. 525-530.
Barbaro, M. (2007), “Saks settles with S.E.C. on overpayments”, New York Times, 6 September,
pp. C12.
Beutel, A.L., and Minner, S. (2012), “Safety stock planning under causal demand forecasting”,
International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 140 No. 2, pp. 637-645.
Big

Lots

(2015),

“Vendor

routing

and

compliance

guide”,

available

at:

https://corp.advanceautoparts.com/ (accessed 6 October 2016).
Biotto, M., De Toni, A.,F., and Nonino, F. (2012), “Knowledge and cultural diffusion along the
supply chain as drivers of product quality improvement”, International Journal of Logistics
Management, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 212-237.
Blankley, A. (2008). “A conceptual model for evaluating the financial impact of supply chain management technology investments”, The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol.
19 No. 2, pp. 155-182.
Boscov’s Department Store (2015), “Department store domestic routing guide”, available at:
http://vspec.boscovs.com/ (accessed 8 April 2016).
Boyle, M. (2017), “Wal-Mart Cracks the Whip on Suppliers”, Bloomberg Businessweek, Vol. 4531,
14-15.
Bradley, P. (2001), “Tiffany & Co.: The logistics of luxury”, Logistics Management and Distribution,
Vol. 40 No. 10, pp. 36-43.
Buckle

(2015),

“Routing

guide/vendor

compliance

manual”,

available

at:

http://buckle.shipcomm.com/ (accessed 8 April 2016).
Bull, C. (1987), “The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts”, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 102 No. 1, pp. 147-159.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016), “North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) at
BLS”, available at: https://www.bls.gov/bls/naics.htm (accessed 8 April 2016).
Business Wire (2007),

“Compliance is not the same as collaboration”,

31

22 February,

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

available at:

http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20070222005934/en/Compliance-

Collaboration (accessed 12 August 2015).
Byron, E. (2005), “Saks to pay vendors $48 million over improper markdown sums”, Wall Street
Journal, 25 August, pp. B8.
Cachon, G.P., Fisher, M. (2000), “Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared
Information”, Management Science Vol. 46 No. 8, pp. 1032-1048.
Cassidy, W.B. (2010), “Wal-mart tightens delivery deadlines”, Journal of Commerce, 8
February, available at:

http://www.joc.com/economy-watch/wal-mart-tightens-delivery-

deadlines 20100208.html (accessed 12 August 2015).
Chain Store Age (2003), “Managing the trading-partner link is the key to success”, Vol. 79 No. 6,
pp. 2A-11A.
Chain Store Age (2016), “How to increase compliance with shipment consolidation”, 11
May, available at: http://www.chainstoreage.com/article/how-increase-compliance-shipmentconsolidation (accessed 8 April 2016).
Charron, K.G. (2006), “Why KPIs belong in supply chain contracts”, Supply Chain Management
Review, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 22-28.
Chen, C.M.J. (2017), “Efficiency of Non-Compliance Chargeback Mechanisms in Retail Supply
Chains”, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2926090.
Chen, J., Lin, D.K. and Thomas, D.J. (2003), “On the single item fill rate for a finite horizon”,
Operations Research Letters, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 119-123.
Chen, C.M.J. and Thomas, D.J. (2017), “Inventory allocation in the presence of service level agreements”, Production and Operations Management, https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12814.
Ching, W., Choi, S., and Huang, X. (2011), “Inducing high service capacities in outsourcing via
penalty and competition”, International Journal of Production Research, Vol. 49 No. 17, pp.
5169-5182.
Christensen, W.J., Germain, R.N. and Birou, L. (2007), “Variance vs average: supply chain leadtime as a predictor of financial performance”, Supply Chain Management: An International
Journal, Vol. 12 No. 5, pp. 349-357.
Craig, N., DeHoratius, N., Jiang, Y. and Klabjan, D. (2015), “Execution quality: An analysis of

32

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

fulfillment errors at a retail distribution center”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 38,
pp. 25-40.
Craig, N., DeHoratius, N., Jiang, Y. and Klabjan, D. (2016), “Fulfillment errors and chargeback
penalties in retail supply chains”, working paper, No. 15-28, Chicago Booth Research Paper,
May 31, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637594.
CVS/pharmacy (2016), “Routing Guide & Supplier Compliance Instructions”, available at:
http://www.cvssuppliers.com/ (accessed 6 October 2016).
Daugherty, P.J., Grawe, S.J. and Caltagirone, J.A. (2010), “A real-world look at SCM”, Supply
Chain Management Review, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 12-19.
Dollar

Tree

(2015),

“Inbound

shipping

requirements

and

regulations”,

available

at:

http://www.dollartreeinfo.com/vendor-partners/ (accessed 14 March 2016).
Douglas, M. (2006), “Slamming the brakes on supplier misbehavior”, Inbound Logistics, Vol. 26 No.
6, pp. 101-103.
Douglas, M. (2012), “Jumping through hoops: The importance of vendor compliance”, Inbound
Logistics, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 100-109.
Douglas, M. (2016), “Richard Foley: Charging hard against chargebacks”, Inbound Logistics, Vol.
36 No. 3, pp. 14-15.
Durango-Cohen, E.J. and Yano, C.A. (2006), “Supplier commitment and production decisions under
a forecast-commitment contract”, Management Science, Vol. 52 No. 1, pp. 54-67.
Fawcett, S. E., Osterhaus, P., Magnan, G. M., Brau, J. C., and McCarter, M. W. (2007). “Information sharing and supply chain performance: the role of connectivity and willingness”, Supply
Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 12 No. 5, pp. 358-368.
Forslund, H. (2007), “The impact of performance management on customers’ expected logistics
performance”, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 27 No. 8,
pp. 901-918.
Forslund, H. (2009), “Logistics service performance contracts: design, contents and effects”, International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 39 No. 2, pp. 131-144.
Forslund, H. (2012), “Performance management in supply chains: Logistics service providers’ per-

33

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

spective”, International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 42 No.
3, pp. 296-311.
Frazelle, E.H. (1998), “Develop world-class supply practices”, Transportation & Distribution, Vol.
39 No. 11, pp. 45-47.
Friedman, H.B. and Yazdi, T. (2010), “Your guide to routing guides”, Inbound Logistics, Vol. 30
No. 8, pp. 43-45.
Gal-Or, E. (1985), “Information sharing in oligopoly”, Econometrica, Vol. 53 No. 2, pp. 329-344.
Gaur, V., Fisher, M.L., and Raman, A. (2005), “An econometric analysis of inventory turnover
performance in retail services”, Management Science, Vol. 51 No. 2, pp. 181-194.
Gaur, V. and Kesavan, S. (2009), “The effects of firm size and sales growth rate on inventory
turnover performance in the U.S. retail sector”, in Agrawal, N. and Smith, S.A. (eds) Retail
Supply Chain Management: Quantitative Models and Empirical Studies, Springer Science &
Business Media, New York, NY, pp 25-52.
Gilmore,

D.

(2010),

“Thinking

about

supply

chain

chargebacks”,

available

at:

http://www.scdigest.com/assets/firstthoughts/10-05-14.php?cid=3464 (accessed 6 October 2016).
Groves, G. and Valsamakis, V. (1998), “Supplier-customer relationships and company performance”, International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 51-64.
Guijarro, E., Cardós, M. and Babiloni, E. (2012), “On the exact calculation of the fill rate in
a periodic review inventory policy under discrete demand patterns”, European Journal of
Operational Research, Vol. 218 No. 2, pp. 442-447.
Ha, A.Y. and Tong, S. (2008), “Contracting and information sharing under supply chain competition”, Management science, Vol. 54 No. 4, pp. 701-715.
Harrington, L. (2008), “TMS under the microscope”, Inbound Logistics, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 48-55.
Hays, C.L. (2001), “Big stakes in small errors: Manufacturers fight retailer ’discounts’ in shipping
disputes”, New York Times, 17 August, pp. C1.
Holmstrom, B. (1981), “Contractual Models of the Labor Market”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 71 No. 2, pp. 308-313.
Inbound Logistics (2014), “Supplier compliance: Ask the experts”, Vol. No. 7, pp. 147-160.

34

IJLM-09-2016-0205-R3

Jaruphongsa, W., Cetinkaya, S. and Lee, C.Y. (2004), “Warehouse space capacity and delivery time
window considerations in dynamic lot-sizing for a simple supply chain”, International Journal
of Production Economics, Vol. 92 No. 2, pp. 169-180.
Katz, N.A. (2003), “Vendor compliance: What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger”, Inbound Logistics, available at: http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/vendor-compliance-whatdoesnt-kill-you-makes-you-stronger/ (accessed 6 October 2016).
Katz, N.A. (2016), Successful supply chain vendor compliance, Gower, Burlington, VA.
Kutner, M.H., Nachtsheim, C.J., Neter, J. and Li, W. (2005), Applied linear statistical models,
McGraw-Hill Irwin, New York, NY.
Lee, H.L., So, K.C., Tang, C.S. (2000). “The value of information sharing in a two-level supply
chain”, Management Science Vol. 46 No. 5, pp. 626–643.
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